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REFORMING THE CRIME OF LIBEL
CLIVE WALKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal libel has a long and troubled history — longer and
even more troubled than its counterpart in civil law.  In its early
guises, it was notable as an instrument of state repression alongside
other variants of libel such as blasphemy and sedition and, in part,
as a corrective to the end of press licensing.  But its usage in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries became less state-oriented.
Though its status as a crime inevitably brings with it an element of
official sanction, criminal libel has latterly evolved as the weapon of
most destruction in the arsenal of libel law.  In this role, it has be-
come a rarity but has survived attempts at eradication in England
and Wales and even the United States.  Its continuance is itself con-
troversial, as well as its content and impact.
This paper will provide in Part II a brief description of the of-
fense of criminal libel in England and Wales so that its distinctive
features can be appreciated.  Part III will detail some of the at-
tempts at reform in that jurisdiction centered around the proposals
of the Law Commission of England and Wales.  There will follow in
Part IV an assessment of the value of the offense, especially in light
of claims to civil liberties, whether to reputation or to free speech.
Is criminal libel worthy of preservation, either in England and
Wales or further afield?  The inquiry will be informed in Part V by
some comparisons with the well-being of the offense in the United
States.
* Professor of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Leeds School of Law; LLB,
University of Leeds, 1975; Ph.D., University of Manchester, 1982.  The author thanks
Sweet & Maxwell for their permission to draw upon materials published in Chapter 22
of GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER (10th ed. 2004).  Thanks are also offered to Professor
Cameron Stracher for hosting the Defamation Discussion Forum at New York Law
School in December 2004, to which this paper was presented, and for the supply of
materials on the crime of libel in the United States.
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II. THE CORE OF THE OFFENSE1
This part of the paper will outline the elements of criminal
libel.  It is necessary to examine the elements of actus reus and
mens rea before listing some of its distinctive features, both in
terms of differences from civil libel and the limited defenses for
speakers.
A. Actus Reus
For many centuries in England and Wales, the publication of
written defamation has amounted to a common law crime (as a mis-
demeanor) punishable on indictment with fine or imprisonment;
however, oral defamation is not a crime, with some exceptions.2
The publication of a libel known to be false became a separate stat-
utory offense under the Libel Act 1843, section 4 and operates as an
“aggravated offence”3 attracting a heavier penalty on the basis of
the significantly variant mens rea.4
The libel must vilify the subject-victim, which may be an indi-
vidual, private or public corporation,5 or unincorporated society or
group.6  The libel’s effect must be the tendency to bring the person
1. See generally LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER NO. 84, CRIMINAL LIBEL (1982);
LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, CRIMINAL LAW: REPORT ON CRIMINAL LIBEL (1985);
LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE CRIME OF LIBEL,
chs. 1, 2, 6 (1991); LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER NO. 35,
CRIMINAL LAW: DEFAMATORY LIBEL (1984); PETER F. CARTER-RUCK & HARVEY STARTE,
CARTER-RUCK ON LIBEL AND SLANDER ch. 18 (Butterworth’s Tolley 5th ed. 1997); GATLEY
ON LIBEL AND SLANDER ch. 22 (Patrick Milmo & W.V.H. Rogers eds., Sweet & Maxwell
10th ed. 2004).  This paper does not cover procedural issues or group libels.
2. See, e.g., GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, supra note 1, at para. 3.8.
3. In Boaler v. The Queen, (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 284, 285, 288, Field J. considered
section 4 to create a new offense and Wills J. considered its relationship to common law
to be akin to the distinct offenses of aggravated and common assault. See also LAW
COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER NO. 84, supra note 1, at para. 3.30.
4. The Libel Act, 1843, c.96, s.4. See GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, supra note 1,
at para. 22.3.
5. See Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass Ltd., [1939] 2 K.B. 395
(C.A.) (stating that corporations can both bring a claim for libel and be indicted for
libel). But see Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534
(H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.) (finding that local councils are not entitled to bring
actions for defamation).
6. Libels upon groups is considered in GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, supra note
1, at ch. 22.18.
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into hatred, contempt, and ridicule.7  The meaning of this phrase
was explored by the House of Lords (the supreme court for En-
gland and Wales) in Gleaves v. Deakin.8  As implied by the word “vil-
ify,” the House of Lords confirmed that “a criminal libel must be
serious libel,” and not trivial, as judged by community standards.9
This condition reflects the origins of the offense which can be
traced to a decree of Alfred the Great in 88010 and the statutory
offense of de Scandalum Magnatum (“slander of the magnates,”
often translated as “the great men”), created as a cross-breed statu-
tory offense between seditious and defamatory libel in 1275.11  The
rationale of the offense was to protect the reputations of persons in
authority in respect of whom it might be said, “the greater the
truth, the greater the libel.”12  Towards the start of the seventeenth
century, the Court of Star Chamber13 engineered a judge-made of-
fense of defamation, the objective of which was to prevent public
disorder through violent retaliation and duelling, and whereunder
proof of truth was not a defense.14  The Star Chamber’s criminal
libel jurisdiction and jurisprudence were, after the restoration of
7. Thorley v. Lord Kerry, (1812) 4 Taunt 355, 364.
8. [1980] A.C. 477 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.D.).
9.  Id. at 487, 495.
10. See Colin Rhys Lovell, The “Reception” of Defamation by the Common Law, 15
VAND. L. REV. 1051  (1962) (describing the origins of the offense of libel).
11. De Scandalis Magnatum, 1275, 13 Edw. 1, c.34. See COMMITTEE ON DEFAMA-
TION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEFAMATION para. 149 (1975); LAW COMMISSION,
WORKING PAPER NO. 84, supra note 1, at para. 2.2; LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND,
supra note 1, ch. 1, para. 1; John Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. REV.
295 (1958); John C. Lassiter, Defamation of the Peers: The Rise and Decline of the Action for
Scandalum Magnatum, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 216 (1978); F.R. Scott, Publishing False News,
30 CAN. B. REV. 37 (1952); Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of
Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1903).  The statutory offense was abolished by the
Statute Law Revision Act 1887.
12. It is thought that this statement was originally made by Lord Mansfield.  Roy
Robert Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 MINN. L. REV. 43, 43 n.1 (1931); David Riesman,
Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 735 n.38 (1942).
13. The criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Star Chamber began in 1488 and was
abolished in 1641.
14. See De Libellis Famosis, 1606, 5 Co. Rep., 125a; LAW COMMISSION, WORKING
PAPER NO. 84, supra note 1, at para. 2.5; LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, supra
note 1, ch. 1, at para. 4.; J.R. Spencer, Criminal Libel — A Skeleton in the Cupboard, CRIM.
L. REV. 383, 384 (1977).
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the English monarchy in 1660, assumed by the common law-based
Court of King’s Bench, as later modified by statute.15
The House of Lords took the opportunity in Gleaves to remove
some of the older political baggage from the actus reus, though one
might argue that the result is net-widening and reflective of the
fragmentation of power within society.16  Thus, a prosecution for
criminal libel need not engage the public interest beyond the norm
for any public prosecution.17  There is no automatic requirement
that the victims be public figures.  Nevertheless, the famous and
prominent are still involved in a disportionate number of cases,
which follows from the fact that the inference of seriousness can be
readily made from the person’s public position.  Further, it need
not be shown that the libel is likely to disturb the peace of the com-
munity or provoke a breach of the peace by an individual,18 nor is it
relevant whether civil remedies for libel should suffice for the per-
son libeled.19  Finally, for prosecutions under the Libel Act 1843,
section 4, it must be shown that the libel is false, though this matter
was (wrongly) presumed in R. v. Wicks.20  In a case not under sec-
tion 4, the libel is presumed to be false unless the defendant raises
and proves justification (the truth of the statement).21
B. Mens Rea
The defendant must have intended to publish the materials
which contain the libel, and, therefore, the careless misplacement
of a criminally libelous aide-memoire intended for oneself will not
result in liability.  It is less certain whether the defendant must have
specific knowledge of the libelous words which have been pub-
15. For a discussion of the later modifications, see LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF
IRELAND, supra note 1, ch. 1, at paras. 5–7, 17–20, 31–33.  The most notable statutory
reforms were the Libel Act, 1792, c.60 (allowing a jury trial of the issue of defamatory
character and not merely publication), and the Libel Act, 1843, c.96, s.6 (providing for
justification as a defense).
16. [1980] A.C. 477 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.D.).
17. Id. at 486.
18. Id. at 483, 486–87, 490, 495.  This point had been largely settled in R. v. Wicks,
[1936] 1 All E.R. 384, 386 (C.C.A.). See also J.R. Spencer, Criminal Libel in Action — The
Snuffing of Mr. Wicks, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 60 (1979).
19. See Gleaves v. Deakin, [1980] A.C. 477, 486 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Q.B.D.). Cf. Goldsmith v. Pressdram, [1977] Q.B. 83, 88.
20. [1936] 1 All E.R. 384 (C.C.A.). See Spencer, supra note 14, at 473.
21. See LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, supra note 1, ch. 6, at para. 170.
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lished.  However, some criminal law commentators, no doubt influ-
enced by the general presumption in English criminal law in favor
of mens rea,22 tend to the view that “[t]he defendant must have
intended to publish the words which are alleged to be libelous. It is
not enough that he intentionally published a book or paper in
which they were contained.”23  This view would excuse distributors
and vendors of newspapers and so on who are (probably subject to
having taken due care) unaware of the libels being purveyed.24
A keener debate surrounds whether there need be knowledge
or belief as to the libelous quality of the words published.  In partic-
ular, what is the significance of the term “maliciously,” as reflected
in the wording of the Libel Act 1843, section 5, and which is meant
to be merely declaratory?25  The implication has, at times, been that
the relevant element is not just an intentional publication, but an
intentional publication with a further malicious intent.26  The mod-
ern view should require mens rea as to the libelous content to be
positively and specifically established by the prosecution, though no
English case has yet emerged to support this proposition.27  Fur-
ther, the prosecution must show that the publisher of a libel known
to be false, contrary to the Libel Act 1843, section 4, had subjective
knowledge of the falsity.28
C. Distinctive Features of Criminal Libel
The publications which are the subject of civil and criminal
libel are largely the same.  However, some communications can
22. See Sweet v. Parsley [1970] A.C. 132 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.D.) (“[I]t
is firmly established by a host of authorities that mens rea is an essential ingredient of
every offence . . . .”).
23. J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, SMITH & HOGAN: CRIMINAL LAW 738 (Butterworths
10th ed. 2002) (citing R. v. Munslow, [1895] 1 Q.B. 758).
24. See Emmens v. Pottle, (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 354, 355 (C.A.); R. v. City of Sault Ste.
Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (Can.).  For a discussion of the standard of negligence, see
LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, supra note 1, ch. 6, at para. 173.
25. R. v. Munslow, (1895) 1 Q.B. 758, 761.  For a very clear survey, see Duffy v.
Baehnk (1993) S.A.S.C. 3828, available at http://austlii.edu.au.
26. See R. v. Evans, (1821) 171 Eng. Rep. 759; The King v. Paine, (1696) 87 Eng.
Rep. 834.
27. But see Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058 (10th. Cir. 1995); R. v. Lucas, [1998]
1 S.C.R. 439 (Can. S.C.); R. v. Stevens, [1995] 100 Man. R.2d 81 (Man. C.A.); R. v.
Stevens, [1993] 7 W.W.R. 38 (Man. Prov. Ct.).
28. See R. v. Wicks [1936] 1 All E.R. 384 (C.C.A.).
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amount exclusively to criminal libel while others, such as one form
of defamation (slander) and other “non-serious” libels, are excused
from criminal liability.  As the rationale of these differences is often
the erstwhile concern with the maintenance of social order, their
survival in contemporary times may be questioned.29  This applies
with especial force to the first category of distinction, which com-
prises publication solely to the person defamed.30  Since breach of
the peace is no longer a constituent element of the actus reus, the
main basis for the offense in this situation is wholly undermined; it
might be better to view it as impliedly abolished rather than some-
how surviving as an inexplicable anomaly.31
A second difference between civil and criminal libel is that it is
a criminal offense to defame a deceased person.  The better view
would seem to be that an extension of the actus reus of the crime
not be recognized in this sense, rather the publication could be
defamatory of living members of the deceased’s family, albeit by
reason of the vilification of the dead relative’s memory.  According
to Stephen J. in R. v. Ensor, “a mere vilifying of the deceased is not
enough.”32  There have been only two recent cases on the issue,
Chiu Chut-Fong v. Law Chup33 and Hilliard v. Penfield Enterprises Ltd.34
They certainly support the proposition that there must be some im-
pact on the family member of the plaintiff.
If a publication is likely to bring a finite group into discredit, it
may be criminal even though it could not be said to be defamatory
of each identifiable individual in the group.  There is no recent au-
29. COMMITTEE ON DEFAMATION, supra note 11, at para. 434.
30. R. v. Brooke, (1856) 7 Cox C.C. 251; R. v. Adams, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 66.
31. For discussions which support the latter view, see LAW COMMISSION, WORKING
PAPER NO. 84, supra note 1, at para. 3.8; LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, supra
note 1, ch. 2, at para. 49.
32. (1887) 3 T.L.R. 366, 367.  The trial judge later wrote that he should have
stated that an actual intent to injure or to provoke or annoy the relatives was essential.
See LEWIS FREDERICK STURGE, STEPHEN’S DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 289 (9th ed.
1950). See also W.H. Binder, Case Notes and Comments: Publicity Rights and Defamation of
the Deceased: Resurrection or RIP?, 12 J. ART & ENT. L. 297 (2002); Raymond Iryami, Give
the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause of Action for Defamation of the Dead from
Criminal Libel Statutes, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1083 (1999);  G.
Zellick, Libelling the Dead, 119 NEW L.J. 769 (1969).
33. [1973] H.K.L.R. 36, 50.
34. [1990] 1 I.R. 138. (Ir.)
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 7 20-FEB-06 12:31
2005-2006] REFORMING THE CRIME OF LIBEL 175
thority in favor of this proposition.35  Nevertheless, in R. v.
Gathercole, Baron Alderson directed the jury to acquit if the libel was
on the entire Roman Catholic community (implying that such a li-
bel could not be covered by the offense of blasphemy, as not relat-
ing to the established Church of England), but that they could
convict on one of the counts if it was a libel on the nearby nunnery
at Scorton, North Yorkshire “generally and on the inmates named
in particular.”36  Again, in R. v. Williams, in which harsh comments
were made about the clergy of the diocese of Durham, the judge
stated that anything published for the purpose of bringing any of
the establishments of the state into hatred and contempt was a libel,
and that the defendant could be found guilty if the publication was
a libel in respect of the clergy generally or even just the clergy of
Durham.37  The jury found a verdict of guilty for libel of the clergy
lving in and near the City of Durham.38  Similarly, libels against the
unnamed magisterial “bullies of the Dartford Bench” were actiona-
ble in R. v. Masters39 and in the Canadian case of R. v. Atkinson, the
court held that an unincorporated political party could be the vic-
tim of a criminal libel.40
A publication may be a criminal libel if it holds a person up to
the hostility of the people amongst whom he lives, whatever their
views, whether “right thinking” or not.  For instance, in R. v. Ma-
latesta, a libel against the anti-government credentials of an Italian
anarchist was indictable in light of how it would be viewed by his
equally anarchistic circle of friends.41
Some of the defenses available in civil law, justification and
privilege, are much narrower in the criminal version.  In particular,
at common law, truth was not a defense to criminal libel,42 but the
Libel Act 1843, section 6, supplies a defense of truth if the defen-
35. See LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER NO. 84, supra note 1, at para. 3.11, and
ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE paras. 29–69 (James Richard-
son ed., 1994), which consider this position to be uncertain.
36. (1838) 168 Eng. Rep. 1140, 1145. Cf. Genest v. R. [1933] 71 Que. S.C. 385.
37. (1822) 106 Eng. Rep. 1308.
38. Id.
39. (1889) 6 T.L.R. 44.
40. [1979] 28 N.B.R.2d 452 (N.B. Prov. Ct.).
41. (1912) 7 Cr. App. R. 273.
42. See R. v. Newman, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 544; COMMITTEE ON DEFAMATION,
supra note 11, at para. 435.
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dant can prove that “it was for the public benefit that the matters
charged should be published.”43  There is no English case authority
on the requirement of “public benefit.”  However, Kenny’s Outlines
of Criminal Law argues that it alludes to publications which are “ob-
jectionable, whether on grounds of decency, or as being disclosures
of state secrets, or as being painful and needless intrusion into the
privacy of domestic life.”44  Section 6 demands objective proof by
the defendant of “the truth of the matters”; it is not sufficient that
the defendant genuinely (or even genuinely and reasonably) be-
lieves the libel to be true.45
Where an occasion is privileged at common law for the pur-
poses of civil libel, it will also be privileged for the purposes of crim-
inal libel.46  But statutes extending privilege to fair and accurate
reports of a wide range of matters have been inconsistent.  Neither
the Defamation Act of 1952 nor the Defamation Act of 1996 applies
to criminal libel.47  Therefore, the probable result is that in pro-
ceedings for criminal libel, absolute privilege for newspaper reports
of criminal proceedings rests, and will continue to rest, on section 3
of the Law of Libel Amendment Act of 1888,48 and that a statutory
defense of qualified privilege is only available in the cases men-
tioned in section 4 of the 1888 Act.
III. REFORM PROPOSALS
The criminalization of speech is suspect in any context.  Absent
the threat of immediate harm, classical liberal theory contends that
even foolish and erroneous speech must take its place in the mar-
ketplace of ideas where it will help to illuminate the truth. This part
of the paper will, therefore, consider the arguments for the reform
of the offense of criminal libel.  Much of the debate has been based
43. The Libel Act, 1843, c.96, s.6.  The requirement of public benefit is not pre-
sent in the civil defense, though malice can defeat a claim of justification arising from a
disclosure of a spent conviction. See Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, § 8.
44. J.W. CECIL TURNER, KENNY’S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 234–35 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 19th ed. 1966).
45. Waterhouse v. Gilmore (1988) 12 N.S.W.L.R. 270, 284. But see R. v. Gladstone
Williams (1983) 78 Cr. App. R. 276. See also Spencer, supra note 14, at 469.
46. R. v. Rule, [1937] 2 K.B. 375. See also R. v. Munslow, [1895] 1 Q.B. 758, 761.
47. See Defamation Act, 1952, s.17(2); Defamation Act, 1996, s.20(2).
48. This has been treated as referring to criminal prosecutions. See R. v. Tibbits,
[1902] 1 K.B. 77, 87; R. v. Parke, [1903] 2 K.B. 432, 438.
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around reports issued by the Law Commission of England and
Wales, which was established by the Law Commissions Act of 1965
to keep the law under review and to recommend reform.
A. The Contemporary Usage of Criminal Libel
It should be admitted at the outset that criminal libel has be-
come a rarity in the English courts.  There were just four prosecu-
tions between 1948 and 1975; between 1970 and 1983, there were
five committals for trial (plus twenty-two cautions); between 1984
and 1995, thirteen persons were found guilty or were cautioned;
and between 1996 and 2001, just five persons were found guilty or
were cautioned.49
Though not commonly invoked, one might contend that crimi-
nal libel performs some valuable functions.50  It may send a signal
as to the importance of rights to reputation and privacy: that the
state has an interest in their protection and they are not to be left to
the vagaries of civil litigation, which requires private initiative and
finance.  The situation may be that the wronged plaintiff cannot
afford the time and cost of litigation, or that the defendant is totally
without means and is, therefore, not worth pursuing.  The advent
of the internet makes the latter scenario much more probable.  The
drawbacks are that the offense is often archaic, obscure, and com-
plex.  It directly impinges on the right to free expression, and its
role has been supplanted by more modern statutory offenses.
B. Law Commission Proposals51
The Law Commission concluded that two more limited statu-
tory offenses should replace the existing common law offense of
defamatory libel.  The Commission first proposed a statutory ver-
sion of criminal defamation, as set out in a draft “Criminal Defama-
tion Bill.”52  The core offense in clause 1(1) would arise when a
person “communicates to any person in England and Wales infor-
mation which is, and which he knows to be, both false and seriously
49. LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra note 1, at para. 2.3.
50. See LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, supra note 1, ch. 6, at para. 181.
51. See generally LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER NO. 84, supra note 1; LAW
COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra note 1.
52. LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra note 1, at app. A.
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defamatory of a third person.”53  The effect of this wording, which
is amplified by clause 1(3), would be to extend the criminal law to
slanders, but at the same time to withdraw its coverage from publi-
cations solely to the victim.54  The offense would be committed by
communication to persons within the jurisdiction, whatever the ter-
ritorial origin of the message or territorial location of the author.55
As for the meaning of “seriously defamatory,” this would be defined
by clause 1(2) as covering “information . . . likely seriously to dam-
age [the victim’s] reputation in the estimation of reasonable people
generally.”56  It is further specified in clause 1(4) that the victim
must be an individual, corporate body, or trade or employers’ body
which is alive or in existence at the time of the communication; it
follows that defamations of the dead or unincorporated groups
would not be crimes.57  Having defined the elements of the offense,
the draft bill proposed to adopt the civil law version of the defense
of privileged communications (clause 2)58 and to require the con-
sent of the Attorney General (rather than a judge) to institute pro-
ceedings (clause 4).59  In total, these proposals could remedy the
most unpalatable features of the existing common law crime:60 that
truth per se is not a defense;61 that the burden of proving public
interest in its ventilation rests with the defendant;62 that the broad-
ening of the defenses to the civil action brought about originally by
the Defamation Act of 1952 are inapplicable;63 that the seriousness
53. The version of the offense set forth in LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER NO.
84, supra note 1, at para. 8.2, includes publishing an untrue statement defamatory of
any person, intending to defame the victim, and knowing or believing the statement to
be untrue.  This would not extend to libels of the dead or groups. Id. at  paras. 8.17,
8.19.
54. LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra note 1, at paras. 7.15, 7.19.
55. Id. at para. 7.32.
56. Id. at app. A.
57. Id. at paras. 7.24, 7.26, 7.27.
58. Since the offense is based on the communication of facts known to be false,
the defenses of justification and fair comment become irrelevant. Id. at para. 7.63.
59. Id. at para. 7.68.
60. Id. at pt. IV.
61. There could be no liability in the first place for true statements and so no
need for a defense of justification, though fair comment would also be abolished as a
defense. Id. at paras. 7.10, 7.63.
62. Id. at para. 7.28.
63. There would be statutory definitions of privilege. Id. at paras. 7.64, 7.66.
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element is wholly vague;64 and that the requisite mens rea is
obscure.65
C. Responses to the Criminal Defamation Bill
Though the proposals were largely endorsed by commentators,
none of the foregoing proposals has been directly implemented.66
Perhaps because of the neglect both in usage of the crime and in
any determination to modernize it, the path of simple abolition
seems to have become more enticing.67  This outcome was subse-
quently endorsed by two further ad hoc official review bodies, the
Calcutt Committee (which was principally reviewing the behavior of
the press in relation to privacy values)68 and the Supreme Court
Procedure Committee on Practice and Procedure in Defamation
(primarily examining civil libel).69  There may be two alternatives
which make criminal libel redundant.
One might suggest that civil libel should be viewed as a more
suitable remedy since it is designed to directly restore the reputa-
tion of the victim by way of damages.  By contrast, in criminal proce-
dures, the victim is in a sense a bystander.  Yet, according to the
Faulks Committee, actions for civil libel cannot avail the impecuni-
ous, and so criminal libel might be a workable alternative.70  In re-
sponse, it may be said, in the first place, that there seems to be (as
already shown) little willingness on the part of the police or Crown
Prosecution Service to take up cases at public expense.  Secondly,
the logic of the arguments that criminal libel is needed either to
take effective action against impecunious defendants, or to fill a
gap in legal aid funding for victims is very suspect.  The result
64. Seriousness is linked firmly to the degree of damage to reputation. Id. at para.
7.9.
65. The new offense would require proof by the prosecution of knowledge or be-
lief as to the facts that the information was seriously defamatory and false. Id. at paras.
7.33, 7.61.
66. See G. Robertson, The Law Commission on Criminal Libel, PUB. L. 283 (1983); J.R.
Spencer, Criminal Libel: The Law Commission’s Working Paper, CRIM. L. REV. 524 (1983).
67. For a further discussion, including the Law Commission’s view, see LAW COM-
MISSION, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, at paras. 5.4, 5.7.
68. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, para. 7.10 (1990).
69. SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN DEFA-
MATION, REPORT ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN DEFAMATION, para. IV 14 (1991).
70. COMMITTEE ON DEFAMATION, supra note 11, at para. 445.
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would be either to “have one law for the rich, who can afford to pay
damages, and another for the poor, who . . . should be sent to
prison”71 or “to introduce one evil as a result of another . . . it
would be a dishonest way of dealing with the inadequately funded
civil legal aid system.”72  In addition, alternative civil remedies are
becoming more accessible as media complaints procedures
(through the offices of the Broadcasting Standards Commission
and the Press Complaints Commission) provide a workable alterna-
tive to civil libel.73
There is also a burgeoning catalogue of criminal law alterna-
tives to criminal libel,74 including the Malicious Communications
Act 1988.75  By section 1(1)(iii) of the Act, any person who sends to
another person a letter or other article which conveys “information
which is false and known or believed to be false by the sender” is
guilty of an offense if it was committed for the purpose of causing
“distress or anxiety” to the direct or intended indirect recipient.76
Section 43 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act of 2001 updates
section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act of 1988 by includ-
ing reference to electronic communications.77  Section 1(2) of the
Malicious Communications Act includes an exception for threats
made on reasonable grounds to enforce demands by what are be-
lieved to be proper means, such as by a letter before action.78  Sec-
tion 43 curtails this defense in that the belief must be objectively
reasonable.  The Act can effectively deal with the main vestige of
mischief, namely private malicious attacks, which represent the
more legitimate business of criminal libel compared to attacks on
public officials.  It may also represent a satisfactory approach, as it
focuses on intentional distress to the recipient rather than the truth
71. Spencer, supra note 14, at 471.
72. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, supra note 1, ch. 6, para. 181 n.33.
73. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ANDREW T. KENYON, DAVID F. PARTLETT & CLIVE P.
WALKER, THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPUTATION, AND FREE SPEECH, chs. 4, 6
(2006).
74. See LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER NO. 84, supra note 1, at pt. V.
75. See id.; LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 147, POISON-PEN LETTERS (1984); Mali-
cious Communications Act 1988, 1988, c.27, §1.
76. The penalty under the 1984 Act has been increased by the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act 1994, s.92, to 6 months imprisonment and a Level 5 fine.
77. Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, § 43.
78. Malicious Communications Act 1988, c.27, §1(2).
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of the contents of the letter.79  The point of principle was recog-
nized by the Law Commission itself, which depicted non-journalist
criminal libels as being “more serious” and “more intractable.”80
Yet, it has been argued that the Law Commission proposals (and
therefore the 1988 Act) do not adequately cater for the mischief of
the “malicious complainant,” who is distinct from the poison pen
writer or constant harasser.81  The main victims are persons in pub-
lic or quasi-public office — police officers, judges, doctors, and
even lecturers and teachers — in which an accessible and formal-
ized procedure means that any complaint will prompt considerable
worry for the target professional and expense and disruption for
the organization.  In these respects, the threat of criminal libel may
be an effective deterrent, though it may conflict with demands for
high standards of service, responsiveness, and integrity which effec-
tive and open complaints systems are meant to encourage.82  The
latest response to the continuing concerns surrounding the social
ills of “poison pen letters,” “character assassination,” and harass-
ment has been instituted by the Criminal Justice and Police Act
2001.83  As well as updating the Malicious Communications Act
1988 in regard to harassment, section 42 of the Criminal Justice
and Police Act allows for a police constable who is present at a resi-
dential scene to issue a direction when it is reasonably believed that
the presence of one of the residents amounts to harassment or is
likely to cause alarm or distress to another resident.84  Contraven-
tion of a direction is a criminal offense.
Another relevant development is the Protection from Harass-
ment Act 1997.85  By section 1, a person must not pursue a course
79. LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 147, supra note 75, at para. 2.5.
80. LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra note 1, at para. 5.8.
81. See, e.g., R v. Penkreth, (1982) 146 J.P. 56. See also J. Marston, Malicious Corre-
spondence: The Malicious Communications Act 1988, 152 J.P. 663 (1988).
82. Spencer, supra note 14, at 472.
83. Civil libel is also utilized against complainants alleged to be malicious, espe-
cially those arising under the police complaints system. WEAVER ET AL., supra note 73,
ch. 4.
84. Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, § 42.
85. Protection from Harassment Act 1997. See generally HOME OFFICE, CONSULTA-
TION PAPER, STALKING — THE SOLUTIONS (1996); TIM LAWSON-CRUTTENDEN & NEIL AD-
DISON, HARASSMENT LAW AND PRACTICE (1997); HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 203, AN
EVALUATION OF THE USE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROTECTION OF HARASSMENT ACT
1997 (2003), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors203.pdf.
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of conduct which “amounts to harassment of another” and which
he knows or ought reasonably to know amounts to harassment; to
pursue such a course of conduct is a summary offense under sec-
tion 2.86  Pursuant to section 7(4), “conduct” amounting to harass-
ment under section 1 (or fear of violence under section 4, as
described below) expressly includes speech.  Section 7(3) states
that a  “course” of conduct is that which is repeated at least twice.
Otherwise, the meaning of “harassment” is deliberately left as an
undefined matter of fact.  A person convicted under sections 2 or 4
may not only be punished, but may also be subject to a restraining
order under section 5 (by which the criminal court orders the of-
fender not to engage in further conduct amounting to harassment
or causing fear of violence).87  Breach of such an order is a further
arrestable offense.  It is clear that the 1997 Act can potentially deal
with at least some of the workload of criminal libel.  For example,
in the Irish criminal libel case of Fleming, the defendant believed
the victims, a married couple, had colluded with a finance institu-
tion which had repossessed his land.88  The defendant wrote ob-
scene graffiti about the couple in public places all around the
country, inviting readers to telephone them to arrange for sexual
intercourse; thousands of calls resulted.89  The actions of such a de-
fendant in the jurisdiction of England and Wales could now
amount to a harassing course of conduct under section 2 of the
1997 Act, which could also trigger the future deterrence of a re-
straining order.  Reference should next be made to contempts of
court90 and public order91 offenses, which could cater for most cir-
cumstances far more proportionately than the blunderbuss of crim-
inal libel.  Wider powers to respond to antisocial behavior are also
available under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.92
86. Protection from Harassment Act 1997, §§ 1–2.
87. Id. §§ 5, 7.
88. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, supra note 1, ch. 6, at para. 181.
89. Id.
90. See Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c.49.
91. See, e.g., Public Order Act, 1986, c.64, §§ 4, 4A, 5.
92. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c.37, § 1. See also Police Reform Act, 2002, c.30,
§ 50 (granting a uniformed office the wide power to demand the name and address of
anyone acting in an anti-social manner).
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Judges have also played their part in reform by their novel in-
terpretations of the criminal law of assault.93  Responding to what is
viewed as a “significant social problem” arising from the activities of
“stalkers” and other forms of harassment of women, the courts have
recognized the possibility of psychological as well as physical injury,
and have allowed for more remote as well as immediate injury to be
viewed as relevant forms of attack.94  On the other hand, the judici-
ary, in the Privy Council decision in Worme v. Commissioner of Police of
Grenada, have also indicated that their attitude towards criminal li-
bel is not as dismissive as some might have foretold.95  In that case,
the editor and publisher of a newspaper in Grenada were charged
with the crime of intentional libel concerning allegations of mis-
spending money during a recent election in order to “bribe” peo-
ple to vote for him.96  The appellants argued unsuccessfully that the
crime of libel was, in general, unnecessary and unjustified in a mod-
ern democracy, and that the particular offense under scrutiny
breached the Grenadian constitution because it did not require the
prosecution to establish that the defamatory matter was untrue.97
The Privy Council held, on the latter point, that the statutory lan-
guage had to be interpreted in accordance with the normal burden
of proof in criminal trials and the constitutional presumption of
innocence.98  If a defendant raised a defense such as justification,
and there was evidence to support it, then the prosecution had to
prove both that the defamatory matter was untrue and that it was
not published for the public benefit.99  On the general point, the
Privy Council emphasized not only the freedom to publish material
discussing political matters and the affairs of public figures, but also
the public interest in protecting the reputations of public figures
93. The relevant charges have been considered under the Offenses against the
Person Act, 1861, c.100, §§ 18 (grievous bodily harm with intent), 20 (grievous bodily
harm), 47 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm).
94. R. v. Ireland, [1998] A.C. 147, 152 (H.L.). See also Cecilia Wells, Stalking: The
Criminal Law Response, CRIM. L. REV. 463 (1997);  Jonathan Herring, Assault By Tele-
phone, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 11 (1997).
95. [2004] UKPC 8, [2004] 2 A.C. 430.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at paras. 25, 31.
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from being falsely debased.100  The existence of a civil remedy for
damages no more renders the crime of intentional libel unneces-
sary than does the existence of the tort of conversion render the
crime of theft unnecessary.  The Privy Council felt further assured
in its support for the crime of libel since the offense was maintained
by such democratic societies as England, Australia, and Canada; so
there was no reason Grenada should be left out in the cold.101
IV. CRIMINAL LIBEL AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
In the absence of fundamental reform, can the crime of libel
be reconciled with the demands of civil liberties?  Within the juris-
diction of England and Wales, this question must first be ap-
proached within the context of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 whereunder
rights are balanced and qualified rather than absolute.
A. Background
While there has been some indirect movement on the agenda
of the Law Commission, the fundamental issue remains unresolved
— is criminal libel acceptable in principle and worthy of salvaging
in the 21st century?  The normative principles most commonly ap-
plied criminal libel come from a rights perspective.  Therefore, this
section of the paper will subject criminal libel to a “rights audit.”  In
the case of the United Kingdom, civil rights are supplied through
the Human Rights Act 1998, which relies wholly upon those rights
specified in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms of 1950 (“Convention”).102  Of greatest rele-
vance is the protection of free expression and its relationship with
the potentially conflicting right to privacy.  The right to privacy is
protected in Article 8, which states:
100. Id. at para. 42.
101. Id. at para. 43.
102. The legislative impacts of the Human Rights Act 1998 are themselves the sub-
ject of many commentaries. See, e.g., RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1st ed. 2000); BEN EMERSON & ANDREW ASHWORTH, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1st ed. 2001); HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE (Lord Anthony
Paul Lester & David Pannick eds., 1st ed. 1999); Clive Walker & Russell Weaver, The
United Kingdom Bill of Rights 1998, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 497 (2000).
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(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accor-
dance with the law and is necessary in a democratic soci-
ety in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the preven-
tion of disorder of crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.103
The Convention also protects the rights to freedom of expresion,
with some restrictions that are necessary in a democratic society, in
Article 10, which states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers . . . .
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formali-
ties, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder of crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclo-
sure of information received in confidence, or for main-
taining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.104
B. The Basis for the Right to Reputation in the Convention
Articles 8 and 10 may provide the two ways in which the right
to personal reputation receives protection under the Convention.
For example, in Rotaru v. Romania, the European Court of Human
Rights stated that the collection of information about an applicant’s
political activities infringed on Article 8 in part because some of the
information had “been declared false and is likely to injure the ap-
103. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Council of Europe, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 005.
104. Id. art. 10, §§ (1)–(2).
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plicant’s reputation.”105 In Radio France v. France, the European
Court of Human Rights declared that “the right to reputation is
included among the rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention
insofar as it is an element of the right to respect for private life.”106
The case was not argued on the basis of Article 8, but under the
logic of a later case, Zollmann v. United Kingdom, which combined
the right to “honour and reputation” under Article 8 with the right
to private life arising from an allegedly untrue statement made by a
government Minister.107  In domestic law, the Court of Appeal has
expressed itself to be “content to assume that a person’s right to
protect his/her reputation is among the rights guaranteed by arti-
cle 8.”108  One potential problem with this path to protection of
reputation under Article 8 concerns the effect of the decision in
Von Hannover v. Germany regarding the photographing of a famous
person.109  The strong statements in the judgment distinguishing
“reporting facts — even controversial ones — capable of contribut-
ing to a debate in a democratic society relating to politicians in the
exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting details of
the private life of an individual”110 would presumably apply to the
printed word just as it applies to photographs, as would the warning
that it takes “certain special circumstances” to be legitimate and to
reveal the private details of public figures.111  This approach ap-
pears less robust than statements under Article 10 about the need
to encourage speech regarding public affairs, and the special role
of the press therein.
105. App. No. 28341/95, para. 44 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 4, 2000), available at http://
echr.coe.int/echr.
106. App. No. 53984/00, para. 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://
echr.coe.int/echr.
107. App. No. 62902/00, p. 16 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://
echr.coe.int/echr.  Though involving a defense of absolute privilege, the fact that the
case was argued under Article 8 did not make a difference to the outcome, not least
because the exceptions under Articles 8(2) and 10(2) are identical.  But this common-
ality of exceptions may not always produce a commonality of outcomes, as illustrated by
W. v. Westminster City Council, [2004] EWHC (QB) 2866, [2005] EWHC (QB) 102.
108. Greene v. Ass’n Newspapers Ltd., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1462, [2005] 2 W.L.R.
281, 299.
109. App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004), available at http://echr.coe.
int/echr.
110. Id. at para. 63.
111. Id. at para. 64.
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The “protection of reputation” is explicitly recognized as a
ground for the curtailment of the freedom of expression under Ar-
ticle 10(2).  It follows that there is no right to defame, and this has
been emphasized, for example, in Steel and Morris v. U.K. (no. 2),
where it was made clear that even political speech must not over-
step certain bounds, such as respect for the reputation of others.112
As yet, there is no decision on English criminal libel, but in the
cases of Lingens v. Austria (no. 1),113 Lingens v. Austria (no. 2),114
Prager v. Austria,115 and Thorgeirson v. Iceland,116 equivalent offenses
were upheld as protecting the reputations of others.  Further, in
Castells v. Spain, an offense preserving the honor of the government
was found to have legitimately protected reputations and prevented
disorder.117
C. English Law and European Convention Jurisprudence
In Gleaves v. Deakin, the House of Lords suggested that the En-
glish version of criminal libel is “difficult to reconcile” with the pro-
visions of the European Convention of Human Rights, and that, at
a minimum, statutory reform would require the permission of the
Attorney General for the commencement of a prosecution.118  Ac-
cording to the Law Commission, the most unpalatable features of
the existing crime are that truth per se is not a defense and that the
burden of proving public interest in its ventilation rests with the
defendant; that the broadening of the defenses to the civil action
brought about originally by the Defamation Act 1952 are inapplica-
ble; that the seriousness element is wholly vague; and that the requi-
112. App. No. 68416/01, para. 90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://
echr.coe.int/echr.
113. 26 D.R. 171 para. 10 (1981), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr, App. No.
8803/79.
114. Ser. A, vol. 103 para. 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 1986), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 9815/82.
115. Ser. A, vol. 313 para. 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 26, 1995), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 15974/90.
116. Ser. A, vol. 239 para. 59 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 25, 1992), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 13778/88.
117. Ser. A, vol. 236 para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 23, 1992), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 11798/85.
118. [1980] A.C. 477, 484, 488, 493, 496, (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.D.). The
trial judge was likewise critical. See Gleaves v. Deakin, TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 1980.
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site mens rea is also obscure.119  The critique which follows will
consider two core issues: does criminal libel give excessive protec-
tion for the right to reputation; conversely, is insufficient weight
given to the right to free expression?
D. Problems of Excessive Protection for the Right to Reputation
The right to reputation is properly recognized in English law,
but that recognition must be proportionate with respect for com-
peting rights.  Can it be said that reputation  necessarily  deserves
protection by the criminal law in a democratic society?
One might argue that the invocation of the criminal law over
and above the threat of civil remedies for the protection of reputa-
tions has a chilling effect on publication that is not justified by the
importance of the interests protected.120  Since R. v. Wicks, criminal
libel has been largely divested of its public order aspects.121  How-
ever, a strong counterargument in favor of criminal libel is that its
use is commonplace elsewhere in Western Europe, and its wide-
scale recognition seems to rule out its fundamental condemnation
on the basis of the European Convention.  Indeed, criminal libel is
the normal method for protection of reputation in most civil law
systems.122
A stark example of attitudes currently prevailing in the Euro-
pean judicial space is the case of Sabou and Pircalab v. Romania.123  A
journalist was convicted of criminal libel and sentenced to ten
months’ imprisonment and the suspension of his parental rights
during his incarceration.124  The conviction was triggered by an ar-
ticle examining the consequences of corruption admitted by offi-
cials.125  There was an Article 10 violation owing to the
disproportionality of the penalty, and a breach of Article 8 prima-
119. LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra note 1, at pt. IV.
120. The chilling impact of civil libel should not be underestimated. See ERIC
BARENDT, LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN, KENNETH NORRIE & HUGH STEPHENSON, LIBEL AND
THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1997).
121. [1936] 1 All E.R. 384 (C.C.A.).
122. See LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER NO. 84, supra note 1, at paras. 4.13, 4.14;
CARTER-RUCK & STARTE, supra note 1, at chs. 29–33.
123. App. No. 46572/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://echr.coe.
int/echr.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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rily because the penal policy damaged the journalist’s children’s in-
terests.126  Subsequent sentences of such length have been struck
down.  In Cumpa˜na˜ v. Romania, the punishments for criminal libel,
imprisonment for seven months and disqualification from journal-
ism for one year (later removed by presidential pardon), were
found to be in breach of Article 10 (especially because of the dis-
qualification, though the convictions were viewed as proper due to
the lack of factual basis for such grave allegations).127  Further, in
Skala v. Poland, a prisoner received a sentence of eight months’ im-
prisonment for criminal insult arising from a letter he wrote to the
president of a regional court to complain about one of the judges
he had encountered; the letter included words such as “irresponsi-
ble,” “clowns,” “cretin,” and “fool.”128  The sentence was viewed as
disproportionate, but the offense of insult, which did not require
publication beyond the victim, was not.  In none of these cases has
the European Court of Human Rights condemned the invocation
of criminal libel per se.
E. Problems of Insufficient Weighting in Favor of Free Expression
Freedom of expression will provide a powerful restraint on the
enforcement of rights to reputation because of the high value
placed upon it by the European Court of Human Rights.  Accord-
ing to the court in Lingens v. Austria, “freedom of expression, as
secured in paragraph 1 of Article 10 . . . constitutes one of the es-
sential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic
conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfil-
ment.”129  If so, there are specific features of criminal libel which
suggest that inadequate weight is given to the value of speech, in-
cluding the lack of defense for statements which are truthful per se
and that it is for the defendant rather than the prosecution to show
that the publication of the truth, rather than its suppression, is in
126. Id.
127. App. No. 33348/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://echr.coe.
int/echr.
128. App. No. 43425/98, para. 11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 27, 2003), available at http://
echr.coe.int/echr.
129. Ser. A, vol. 103 para. 41 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 1986), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 9815/82.
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the public interest — “this is to turn Article 10 of the Convention
on its head.”130
Freedom of expression is explicitly limited for the protection
of individuals’ reputations under Article 10(2).  The balance be-
tween these interests has been considered in a number of Euro-
pean Court cases, but any restriction must be proportionate.  In
Barfod v. Denmark, the European Court made clear that the concept
does not involve equality between competing interests, stating:
[P]roportionality implies that the pursuit of the aims
mentioned in Article 10 para. 2 . . . has to be weighed
against the value of open discussion of topics of public
concern. When striking a fair balance between these in-
terests, the Court cannot overlook . . . the great impor-
tance of not discouraging members of the public, for fear
of criminal or other sanctions, from voicing their opin-
ions on issues of public concern.131
Some of the relevant factors which have affected the decisions have
already been mentioned, and include the nature of the response —
whether pre-publication censorship or post-publication sanctions
are to be applied.  In addition to these points, the relevant cases
offer the guidelines that follow.132
Publications concerning important party political matters of
public interest are more worthy of protection under Article 10 than
speech about private lives.133  There is arguably the highest level of
protection for the speech of politicians themselves about political
130. Gleaves v. Deakin, [1980] A.C. 477, 483 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.D.).
131. Ser. A, vol. 149 para. 29 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 1989), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 11508/85.
132. See Sandra Coliver, Defamation Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, 13 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 250 (1992); Ian Loveland, A Sign of Things to Come? The
ECHR and a “Public/Private” Divide in the Civil Law of Defamation, 1 COMM. L. 193 (1996);
Dirk Voorhoof, Defamation and Libel Laws in Europe — The Framework of Article 10 of the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 13 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 254 (1992).
133. See Lingens v. Austria, 26 D.R. 171 (1981), available at http://echr.coe.int/
echr, App. No. 8803/79; Scharsach v. Austria, App. No. 39394/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov.
13, 2003), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, App.
No. 37698/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr;
Oberschlick v. Austria, Ser. A, vol. 204 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 23, 1991), available at http://
echr.coe.int/echr, App. No. 11662/85; Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2), App. No. 20834/
92 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 1, 1997), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Schwabe v. Aus-
tria, Ser. A, vol. 242–B (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 28, 1992), available at http://echr.coe.int/
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or public matters.  This facet of the impact of Article 10 emerged in
Castells v. Spain.134  Despite the concern about a defense of truth in
Castells, in cases involving politicians or public officials, there is a
line of authority which suggests that the truth of an allegation is not
necessary for protection under Article 10.135  In addition to speech
about party political matters, the European Court has been almost
as keen to encourage speech about other public affairs of wider
interest, though perhaps at a less indulgent level than with party
political speech.136  Thus, the court has strictly reviewed any actions
in libel arising out of allegations concerning public officials such as
local government officials or police officers, though it has not ex-
pressly recognized any “public figure” doctrine.137
Just as the content of speech is important, so its vehicle may
also prove to be relevant.  In this regard, the court seems especially
indulgent towards the press.138  In Jersild v. Denmark, it was accepted
that “[a]lthough formulated primarily with regard to the print me-
dia, these principles doubtless apply also to the audio-visual media,”
though the immediate and powerful effect of that medium must
echr, App. No. 13704/88; Lingens v. Austria, Ser. A, vol. 103 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8,
1986), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr, App. No. 9815/82.
134. Ser. A, vol. 236 para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 23, 1992), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 11798/85.
135. See Tammer v. Estonia, App. No. 41205/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2001), availa-
ble at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Schwabe v. Austria, Ser. A, vol. 242–B (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Aug. 28, 1992), available at  http://echr.coe.int/echr , App. No. 13704/88; Oberschlick
v. Austria, Ser. A, vol. 204 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 23, 1991), available at http://echr.coe.int/
echr, App. No. 11662/85; Lingens v. Austria, Ser. A, vol. 103 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8,
1986), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr, App. No. 9815/82.
136. See, e.g., Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June, 29, 2004),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Radio France v. France, App. No. 53984/00 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr.
137. See X. v. Germany, 3 D.R. 159 (1975), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr,
App. No. 6988/75; Selisto¨ v. Finland, App. No. 56767/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2004),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Vides Aizsardzıˆbas Klubs v. Latvia, App. No.
57829/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 27, 2004), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Dalban v.
Romania, App. No. 28114/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 28, 1999), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr; Thorgeirson v. Iceland, Ser. A, vol. 239 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 25, 1992),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr, App. No. 13778/88.
138. See Castells v. Spain, Ser. A, vol. 236 para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 23, 1992),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr, App. No. 11798/85.
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also be taken into account in considering both their potential and
their dangers.139
The manner of expression does not, in principle, reduce the
protections of the Convention.  As stated in Lingens v. Austria, “free-
dom of expression, as secured in paragraph 1 of Article 10, . . . is
applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference,
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”140  However, it
would seem from Oberschlick v. Austria, that the more inflammatory
the message being commented upon, the harsher and stronger the
terms of the response may be.141  Value judgments, such as political
rhetoric, must be distinguished from the need to establish facts.142
Turning to negative factors tending against protection under
Article 10, where the alleged libel impinges on other important in-
terests aside from personal reputation, there may be a reason for
downgrading the value of the expression.  One such possibility is
where it can be shown that political or other utterances may lead to
disorder or unrest.  In such instances, countermeasures may be
taken.  The same applies to undermining confidence in the judici-
ary,143 though lawyers have been allowed to point out the error of
each other.144
139. Ser. A, vol. 298 para. 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23, 1994), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 15890/89.
140. Ser. A, vol. 103 para. 41 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 1986), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 9815/82.  This echoes very closely dicta in Handyside v. U.K.,
Ser. A, vol. 24 para. 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 7, 1996), available at http://echr.coe.int/
echr, App. No. 5493/72; Sunday Times v. U.K., Ser. A, vol. 217 para. 50 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Nov. 26, 1991), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr, App. No. 13166/87.
141. Ser. A, vol. 204 para. 58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 23, 1991), available at http://echr.
coe.int/echr, App. No. 11662/85.
142. See Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, App. No. 72713/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Mar. 29, 2005), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr.
143. Perna v. Italy, App. No.48898/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 6, 2003), available at
http://echr.coe.int/echr; Les˘nı´k v. Slovakia App. No. 35640/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 11,
2003), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Barfod v. Denmark, Ser. A, vol. 149 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 1989), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr, App. No. 11508/85.
144. See Nikula v. Finland, App. No. 31611/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 21, 2002), availa-
ble at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Scho¨pfer v. Switzerland, App. No. 25405/94 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. May 20, 1998), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Steur v. Netherlands App.
No. 39657/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr;
Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, App. No. 60115/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 20, 2004), available
at http://echr.coe.int/echr.
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Where the court views a statement as not being seriously made,
in particular, if it was published without proper research and inves-
tigation, or with an improper motive, then it will not wish to protect
what it views as bad journalism.  It is up to journalists to establish
their facts in advance.145
V. CRIMINAL LIBEL IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS
It is evident from the foregoing survey that the European
Court is relatively indulgent towards the concept of criminal libel
and the English law version would not per se infringe its jurispru-
dence.  A mixed picture also emerges from a survey of common law
jurisdictions.
A. Outside the United States
While the law has remained static in England and Wales, com-
parable common law jurisdictions have undertaken reform, includ-
ing abolition, but the picture overall is far from uniform.  For
example, criminal libel survives in the Republic of Ireland on much
the same basis as in England and Wales,146 though the Irish Law
Reform Commission has advocated that the offense be retained in a
more confined form.147  The offense has been expressly retained by
145. Lingens v. Austria, 26 D.R. 171 para. 7 (1981), available at http://echr.coe.
int/echr, App. No. 8803/79; Pedersen v. Denmark, App. No.49017/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Bergens Tidende v. Norway, App.
No. 26132/95, para. 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2000), available at http://echr.coe.int/
echr; Oberschlick v. Austria, App. No. 20834/92 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 1, 1997), available at
http://echr.coe.int/echr; De Haes v. Belgium, App. No. 19983/92 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb.
24, 1997), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr; Prager v. Austria, Ser. A, vol. 313 para.
9 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 26, 1995), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr, App. No. 15974/
90; Schwabe v. Austria, Ser. A, vol. 242–B, paras. 10, 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 28, 1992),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr, App. No. 13704/88.
146. There have been just two recent criminal libel cases in Ireland. See Fleming,
IRISH TIMES, Nov. 23, 1989; Hilliard v. Penfield Enterprises Ltd., [1990] 1 I.R. 138, H.C.
147. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, REPORT ON CRIMINAL LIBEL ch. 2 para 1.
(1991), available at http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/reports.htm.  See also LAW
REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, supra note 1, ch. 6, at paras. 180–181, 187, which is
more fully argued on this point.  The Report of the Legal Advisory Group on Defama-
tion continues to pursue the notion of a more confined offense with the folowing ele-
ments: (i) a person without lawful authority or reasonable cause; (ii) intentionally and
with malice publishes a false statement in relation to a natural person; (iii) that state-
ment was calculated to damage gravely and has damaged gravely the reputation of that
person; and (iv) was calculated to cause and has caused serious harm to the mind of the
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statute in India,148 Malaysia,149 Singapore,150 and most states of Aus-
tralia.151  On the other hand, criminal defamation was abolished in
1992 in New Zealand152 after two final, controversial cases.153
Criminal libel survives in Canada,154 although the Canadian
Law Reform Commission has called for its abolition.155  It has also
been under heavy judicial fire, prompted by the guarantee of free-
dom of expression in section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights of 1982.
The attack in Lucas v. Minister of Justice resulted in the striking down
of section 301 of the Federal Criminal Code of 1985, which repro-
duces much of the basic English common law offense.156  Con-
versely, sections 298, 299, and 300 (which are equivalent to section
person who was the subject of the statements. LEGAL ADVISORY GROUP ON DEFAMATION,
REPORT OF THE LEGAL ADVISORY GROUP ON DEFAMATION (2003).
148. INDIA PEN. CODE, §§ 499, 502.
149. Sedition Act 1948, which can overlap with criminal libel. See Tengku Jaffar bin
Tengku Ahmad v. Karpal Singh, [1993] 3 M.L.J. 156.
150. PEN. CODE, ch. 224, § 499. See Harbans Sigh Sidhu v. Public Prosecutor, 1973
S.L.R. LEXIS 10, HC.
151. Criminal Code Act, 1983, §§ 203–208 (1983) (N. Terr. Austl. Laws) (the possi-
bility of a small fine conditional upon an early correction under the Defamation Act
1989, § 7 has now been repealed); Defamation Act, 1974, § 50 (1974) (N.S.W. Acts);
Criminal Code Act 1958, § 9; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, § 257 (as amended
by the Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Public Offenses) Act 1992); Criminal Code
Act 1924, §§ 196–225; Criminal Code 1913, § 350.  Most reports have recommended
retention and reform rather than repeal. See CRIMINAL LAW AND PENAL REFORM COM-
MITTEE, REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW AND PENAL REFORM COMMITTEE (1977); AUSTRA-
LIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 11, UNFAIR PUBLICATION: DEFAMATION AND
PRIVACY, para. 203 (1979); AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY COMMUNITY LAW REFORM
COMMITTEE, REPORT ON DEFAMATION (1991); LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF WESTERN AUS-
TRALIA, PROJECT NO. 8, REPORT ON DEFAMATION ch. 22 (1980).  Repeal has occurred in
just one case. See Law Reform (Abolition and Repeals) Act 1996, § 4.
152. The Crimes Act 1961, Pt. IX, §§ 211–216 was abolished by the Defamation Act
1992, § 56, sched. 3, as recommended by the COMMITTEE ON DEFAMATION, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS ON THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, para. 459 (1977).  As in England and Wales, the
Harassment Act 1997 covers some of the same mischieves as criminal libel. See Beadle v.
Allen, [2000] N.Z.F.L.R. 639 (H.C.); B. v. Reardon, [2000] D.C.R. 575 (D.C.).
153. Police v. McLachlan, [1989] 3 N.Z.L.R. 689 (H.C.); Police v. W. [1989] 3
N.Z.L.R. 696 (H.C.).
154. Criminal Code, §§ 297–317 (R.S. C–46, 1985 ed.). See LAW REFORM COMMIS-
SION OF CANADA, supra note 1.
155. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 1, at 60.
156. [1995] 31 C.R.R.2d 92.
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4 of the Libel Act 1843) escaped total condemnation in R. v. Lucas,
the leading judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court.157
B. Inside the United States
Criminal libel has been largely, but not completely, curtailed
in the United States.158  The adoption by American secessionists of
the mechanics of English repression was paradoxical, especially as
its application in colonial times had been the source of much agita-
tion.159  Nevertheless, crimes against individual reputation160 did
resurface, primarily at the state level,161 including limits on truth as
a defense, which were generally reversed by state statutory versions
157. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439.  Lucas’s attempt to overturn his conviction was dismissed
in Lucas v. Dueck, [2002] 214 Sask. R. 213. Compare R. v. Stevens [1995] 28 C.R.R.2d 78
(declaring the constitutionality of s.300) with R. v. Gill [1996] 35 C.R.R.2d 369 (finding
s.301 unconstitutional).
158. For the history of criminal libel in the United States, see Robert A. Leflar, The
Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 TEX. L. REV. 984 (1956); Note, Constitu-
tionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, COLUM. L. REV. 521 (1952). See also Janet Boeth
Jones, Validity of Criminal Defamation Statutes, 68 A.L.R.4th 1014 (1996). But see LAW
COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra note 1, at para. 8.4.
159. Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American
Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433, 455-56 (2004).
160. For a comparison of statutes relating to statements about the liquidity of finan-
cial institutes or the fitness of specific officials such as teachers or law enforcement
personnel, see Criminalizing Speech About Reputation: The Legacy of Criminal Libel in the U.S.
after Sullivan and Garrison, MLRC BULLETIN 2003 NO. 1 (Media Law Resource Ctr., New
York, N.Y.), Mar. 2003, at 27.  More recently, successful attacks have also been made on
offenses relating to the filing of false allegations against police officers, which have been
depicted as a form of indirect criminal libel offenses. See Eakins v. Nevada, 219 F. Supp.
2d 1113 (D. Nev. 2002) (finding that NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.325, which criminalized the
filing of false allegations against peace officers, violated the First Amendment); Hamil-
ton v. San Bernadino, 107 F. Supp.2d 1239 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 148.6 violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Gritchen v. Collier, 73 F.
Supp.2d 1148 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding CAL. CIV. CODE § 47.5 violative of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments). But see People v. Atkinson, 58 P.3d 465 (Cal. 2002) (uphold-
ing CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.6), rev’g People v. Stanistreet, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct.
App. 2001).  There are also statutes which punish making knowingly false statements in
election campaigns. See Representation of the People Act, 1983, c.2, § 106 (U.K.).
161. There have been some related statutes at the federal level, including the Sedi-
tion Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596; 18 U.S.C. § 1718 (1945) (making it an offense
to post envelopes with extant libels), invalidated by Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d
1087 (8th Cir. 1973), repealed by Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647,
§ 1210(c), 104 Stat. 4832.  Attempts to establish jurisdiction over a state crime of libel
committed on federal territory was rejected in United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219
U.S. 1 (1911).
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as the nineteenth century wore on.  Their use declined over a cen-
tury and a half, as much for cultual as legal reasons.162  Yet, it took
until the 1966 case of Ashton v. Kentucky for an unequivocal con-
demnation of the inherent vagueness and breadth of the common
law crime.163  Amongst the problems are that the level of one’s so-
cial reputation cannot be objectively determined and therefore
there is no objective standard against which to judge criminal
harm.
Those states which have retained criminal libel have adopted
statutory versions of criminal libel, either in response to Ashton or
beforehand.164  Yet other problems of constitutionality remain.165
In Garrison v. Louisiana,166 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
crime must meet the First Amendment demands for respect of free
speech, including an unqualified respect for truth as a defense and
proof of “actual malice” in cases affecting public figures as in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.167
Following the decisions in Ashton and Garrison, it is widely per-
ceived that “there remains little constitutional vitality to criminal
libel laws,”168 especially as few statutes clearly articulate the re-
162. See John Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. REV. 295, 317 (1958).
163. See 384 U.S. 195 (1966). See also Tollett, 485 F.2d 1087; Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F.
Supp. 1502 (D.S.C. 1991); Velasco v. Municipal Court, 147 Cal. App.3d 340 (Ct. App.
1983); Boydstun v. State, 249 So. 2d 411 (Miss. 1971).
164. But just eight states retained the common law version. See State v. Shank, 795
So. 2d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Gottschalk v. State 575 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1978);
Boydstun, 249 So. 2d 411. See also MLRC BULLETIN, supra note 160, at 13.
165. In addition to the Garrison standard, it has been argued that Gertz v. Robert
Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974), demands proof of negligence as to the falsity of the state-
ment even in non-public issue cases. See DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S
GUIDE para. 4.5 (1993).
166. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). See also Moity v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 201 (1964) (striking
down the Louisiana statute which provided that truth was a defense only if made out
with good motives).
167. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 73.
168. Tollett, 485 F.2d at 1094.  There have been many decisions striking down crimi-
nal libel laws. See, e.g., Fitts, 779 F. Supp. 1502; Gottschalk, 575 P.2d 289; State v. Defley,
395 So. 2d 759 (La. 1981); Eberle v. Municipal Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct. App.
1976); Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412 (Ark. 1975); Commonwealth v. Armao, 286 A.2d
626 (Pa. 1972); Commonwealth v. Mason, 322 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1972); State v. Snyder, 277
So. 2d 660 (La. 1972); State v. Brown, 206 A.2d 591 (N.J. 1965).
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quired standards on truth and public figures.169  Consequently,
only those state statutes that require actual malice,170 or have a
strong dependence on the old rationale of public disturbance,171 or
are directed against extortion,172 or protect purely private individu-
als have survived.173  Yet the perception of a constitutionally in-
spired “death blow” to the offense of criminal libel,174 even in
public issue cases, is belied by the survival of the crime in twenty-five
states and territories175 despite the strong signal given by the Model
Penal Code which, since 1962, has omitted the offense of criminal
libel.176
One of the fuller and more recent affirmations of constitution-
ality occurred in Phelps v. Hamilton.177  Fred Phelps, a preacher in
the Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas, conducted a vitu-
perative and vicious campaign against homosexuals, including spe-
169. The Media Law Resource Center suggests that a total of four states have such
statutes: Kansas, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Utah. See MLRC BULLETIN, supra
note 160, at 16.
170. State v. Cox, 167 So. 2d 352 (La. 1964).
171. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); People v. Heinrich, 470 N.E.
2d 966 (Ill. 1984). But see Porter v. Kimzey, 309 F. Supp. 993 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff’d, 401
U.S. 985 (1971)(stating that clarity is also required in defining the type of feared distur-
bance); Williamson v. State, 295 S.E.2d 305 (Ga. 1982).
172. See MLRC BULLETIN, supra note 160, at 30.  There is also a federal statute, 8
U.S.C. § 875(d). See also United States v. Jackson, 986 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
aff’d on reh’g, 196 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 1999).
173. But see People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 942 (Colo. 1991) (Quinn, J., dissenting)
(stating that there is still the problem of vagueness and the chilling effect from “the
amorphous and uncertain zone of criminality created by [criminal libel]”).  In addition,
there must be protection for statements dealing with public concerns even if no public
officials or figures are involved. See Commonwealth v. Armao, 286 A. 2d 626 (Pa. 1972);
State v. Powell, 839 P.2d 139 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Shad L. Brown, Criminal Libel Statute
Held Unconstitutional as Applied to Public Statements Involving Public Concerns: State v. Pow-
ell, 24 N.M. L. REV. 495 (1994).  For a more recent attempt to strike down the criminal
defamation offense in Colorado, see Mink v. Salazar, 344 F. Supp.2d 1231 (D. Colo.
2004).
174. ELDER, supra note 165.
175. Lisby, supra note 159, at 479.  The figure of twenty-five is contestable because
statutory versions do not exactly mirror the common law version.  A total of seventeen is
suggested by the Media Law Resource Center. See MLRC BULLETIN, supra note 160, at i.
176. MLRC BULLETIN, supra note 160, at 8.
177. Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1995).  Attempts to strike down
the criminal defamation offenses in Kansas failed in Thomas v. City of Baxter Springs, 369
F. Supp.2d 1291 (D. Kan. 2005); How v. Baxter Springs, 369 F. Supp.2d 1300 (D. Kan.
2005).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 30 20-FEB-06 12:31
198 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
cific allegations of child abuse, AIDS infection, and promiscuity
against named individuals.178  Charges were brought against him
under a Kansas statute which penalized:
[M]aliciously communicating to a person orally, in writ-
ing, or by any other means, false information tending to
expose another living person to public hatred, contempt
or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public
confidence and social acceptance, or tending to degrade
and vilify the memory of one who is dead and to scandal-
ize or provoke his living relatives and friends.179
There are perhaps two features which saved this offense from cen-
sure.  First, similar to the English Libel Act 1843, section 4, this law
only applies to “false information.”  Further it provides that the
truth of the information communicated shall be a defense.  Sec-
ondly, in light of the fact that the statute had been redrafted post-
Sullivan in 1969, and that a full mens rea was  normally required
under Kansas criminal law, the U.S. Court of Appeals interpreted
the requirement that the communication be made “maliciously” as
demanding proof of “actual malice” (in the sense that the defen-
dant must intend not only to publish but also to defame)180 in all
cases, whether the defamation is against a public official or figure
or not.181  In the latter aspect, the Kansas statute was distinguished
from previous challenges to criminal defamation contained in state
statutes, which had almost always resulted in the striking down of
the offense.182  No doubt to be on the safe side, the Kansas statute
was further amended in 1995.  Now, instead of “maliciously,” it
states that the defendant must publish “knowing the information to
178. Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1062.
179. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004 (2005).
180. Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1073.  This accords with arguments rehearsed earlier as to
what might be a “modern” view of mens rea.  However, there was evidence that Kansas
in fact adopted the nineteenth century view that the defendant was guilty if the publica-
tion was without just cause of excuse and this convinced the lower District Court to
strike down the statute. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 828 F. Supp. 831, 847 (D. Kan. 1993).
181. There is no constitutional requirement of actual malice for purely private def-
amation. Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1073.  Because of their high profile campaign and because
Hamilton, the District Attorney who prosecuted them, had stood for election on an
anti-hate, anti-prejudice, and anti-“Fred” platform, Phelps and the other defendants
had become public figures. Id. at 1070.
182. Id. at 1072. See also Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502, 1511 (D.S.C. 1991).
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be false and with actual malice.”183  However, the issues of vague-
ness and overbreadth184 have not been fully addressed, nor has
there been any convincing explanation of the pressing need for
speech content suppression such as is imposed by criminal libel.
Indeed, it has been argued that the protection of reputations offers
only “a weak and questionable basis for governmental intervention
into the delicate area of regulating expression.”185
In several other recent cases, the issue of constitutionality has
passed by without comment.  In State v. Wolf, the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals upheld a conviction for defamation based on the distri-
bution of signs, letters, and notes that stated, among other things,
that the victim sold pornography at his stores.186
By contrast, the offense of criminal libel has been more often
struck down. Examples during the the past decade include State v.
Helfrich  (on the grounds that the statute prohibited truthful criti-
cism when not communicated for good motives and justifiable
ends);187 Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat  (because the Puerto Rican statute
on criminal libel had no requirement of absolute malice and did
not recognize truth as an absolute defense);188 Ivey v. Alabama (on
the grounds that the statute did not require proof of actual mal-
ice);189 and IML v. Utah (because the relevant offense had no re-
quirement of absolute malice and did not recognize truth as an
absolute defense).190
183. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004 (2005).
184. For example, it may be noted that two of the seven impugned libels were
against dead persons. See Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1062.
185. Tollett v. United States, 485 F. 2d 1087, 1096 (8th Cir. 1973).
186. 2000 WI App 161, ¶ 2 n.3, 238 Wis.2d 95, ¶ 2 n. 3, 617 N.W.2d 678, ¶ 2 n. 3.
Another uncontested Wisconsin case is State v. Dabbert, in which the defendant was con-
victed of damaging the reputation of his former employer by posting her name with an
ad seeking sex partners on a website entitled “Sex on the Side.” See Lisa Sink & Linda
Spice, Man Charged with Defamation; Disgruntled Fired Employee Accused of Posting Ad with
Ex-Boss’ Name on Internet, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, June 7, 2000, at 1B; Lisa Sink,
Man Convicted of Posting Ex-Boss’ Name on Sex Site; Defamation Case Believed to be County’s
First Such Internet Prosecution, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Aug. 11, 2000, at 1B.
187. 922 P.2d 1159, 1163–64 (Mont. 1996).
188. 317 F.3d 45, 65–69 (1st Cir. 2003). See also Soto v. Rodriguez, 306 F. Supp.2d
120 (P.R. 2004).
189. 821 So. 2d 937, 946 (Ala. 2001).
190. 2002 UT 110, 61 P.3d 1038.  But note that Justice Wilkins recommended re-
form rather than abolition as in this case the defendant probably did harbor actual
malice. Id. at 1051. See also Edward L. Carter, Outlaw Speech on the Internet: Examining the
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Criminal libel could be condemned on more sweeping consti-
tutional grounds, which are more difficult to remedy by legislative
wordplay, and it has been commented that the U.S. Supreme Court
failed “miserably” in Garrison by simply applying Sullivan civil stan-
dards to the more draconian restraint of criminal libel.191  First, it
could be argued that its vague breadth allows arbitrary or over-
broad enforcement, which is particularly dangerous in the field of
speech.  That criminal libel might easily revert to some of its an-
cient origins as the protector of “great men” has been a complaint
of many commentators over many years.192  There is also quantita-
tive evidence from various state jurisdictions of its potential for un-
due attention to political speech.  It has been computed that
between 1797 and 1996, 595 criminal libels were dealt with by ap-
peal courts, 38% of which concerned public officials.193  More
troubling is that the rate in recent years (52% in 1990-2002) is undi-
minished by the assault of Garrison.194  The figure is actually rising
because of the breadth and ease of Internet publications.195
Criminal libel triggers the further constitutional problem that
the key terms such as hatred, contempt, or ridicule can be said to
be impermissibly content-based.  This was sustained in State v.
Shank, in which the court stated that “[t]he statute criminalizes
speech based solely on content, i.e., speech that criticizes or
ridicules is targeted, while other ‘nice’ publications that praise or
promote approval, admiration, or commendation are not
penalized.”196
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the improvements which would undoubtedly be
achieved by the implementation of the English Law Commission’s
Link Between Unique Characteristics of Online Media and Criminal Libel Prosecutions, 21
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 289 (2005).
191. Lisby, supra note 159, at 433.
192. Leflar, supra note 158.
193. Lisby, supra note 159, at 467.
194. Id.  The Media Law Resource Center relates that there have been seventy-
seven prosecutions since Garrison (1965 – 2002) and that fifty-three concern public offi-
cials and public issues. MLRC BULLETIN, supra note 160, at 35.
195. Carter, supra note 190, at 289.
196. 795 So. 2d 1067, 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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proposals, the path of simple abolition seems even more enticing
for the following reasons.197
First, there is no convincing rationale for the offense, as the
historic concerns about the standing of “great men” and the pre-
vention of more violent resolutions, such as duelling, have largely
disappeared.  In reply, it might be accepted that the rationale for
the offense has shifted over the years and that the protection of the
criminal libel law (at least if reformed) could now be viewed as justi-
fiable in terms of principle because of the serious misery inflicted
on the victim’s interests in privacy, autonomy, and proprietorial
reputation;198 the moral blameworthiness on the part of the perpe-
trator; the public interest in the performance of office-holders; and
the drawbacks of civil remedies (especially costs).199  Ultimately, the
issue is whether behavior which is undoubtedly unpleasant, hurtful,
and anti-social can be seen as sufficiently disturbing “the commu-
nity’s sense of security” either through the gravity of the harm done
or the need for public condemnation and deterrence.200  The an-
swer must, of course, be based on history, culture, and politics
rather than law, and especially the values placed respectively on
speech, privacy, reputation, and liberty.  As far as the United States
is concerned, these considerations are unlikely to provide a compel-
ling state interest in most cases, though European jurisdictions
clearly take a different view as to the appropriate balance.
The use of the criminal law as a response to libel at any level
involves a most serious threat to rights to free expression precisely
because it invokes public condemnation, deterrence, and punish-
ment.  According to this argument, this use of the criminal law
against wild expressions, even if prompted by a private party, is a
dangerous instrument to make available in a modern liberal de-
mocracy.  In particular, a major fear is that it will be used by the
state for state purposes or by the rich and powerful.  But speech
197. For the Law Commission’s view, see LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra
note 1, at paras. 5.4, 5.7.
198. See also R v. Van Vuuren, 1961 (3) SA 305 (EC) at 308 (S. Afr.) (“[D]efence
against injury should include both injury to the person and dignity, for injury to the
latter may be even more serious than the former and less easily remedied.”).
199. LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra note 1, at para. 5.5.
200. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 cmts. at 44 (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1961).  The
crime was dropped from the final version.
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about the powerful is to be encouraged rather than threatened with
punishment for “a medieval crime from which the aura of public
interest has substantially departed with the passage of time.”201
Even false and ludicrous speech can assist a society’s political and
social debates by challenging orthodoxies and sharpening argu-
ments and understandings.  In any event, the designation of “truth”
assumes an unerring and unconscionable degree of discernment
and infallibility.202  The response that times have changed and that
criminal libel would now be utilised more by the common people
rather than the great and the good is also contestable.  It is interest-
ing that the final two reported prosecutions for criminal defama-
tion in New Zealand before its recent abolition were one by a
humble local branch manager of a trading company203 and the
other by the mighty former Prime Minister, Sir Robert Muldoon.204
According to the Privy Council in Hector v. Attorney General of Anti-
gua and Barbuda, the crime of libel is
a grave impediment to the freedom of the press if those
who print, or a fortiori those who distribute, matter re-
flecting critically on the conduct of public authorities
could only do so with impunity if they could first verify
the accuracy of all statements on which the criticism was
based.205
Next, there is no evidence of a pressing social need in any of
the jurisdictions described hitherto.  The statistics for the recent us-
age of criminal libel have already been given and suggest that there
are very few instances where criminal libel need even be invoked.
Furthermore, one would assume that the English Law Commis-
sion’s much narrower proposed offense would produce even fewer
cases and impose even less deterrence.  Criminal libel has not
emerged as indispensible in order to deal with any special subset of
201. Leflar, supra note 158, at 1034.  The author found that a substantial propor-
tion of U.S. libel cases were “political.” Id. at 985.  The cases have included, for exam-
ple, prosecutions for “expos[ing] the memory of George Washington to hatred,
contempt, and obloquay.”  State v. Haffer, 162 P. 45, 45 (Wash. 1916). But see LAW
COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 149, supra note 1, at para. 8.4.
202. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 64 (1956); Zundel v. R., [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
203. Police v. W. [1989] 3 N.Z.L.R. 696 (H.C.).
204. Police v. McLachlan [1989] 3 N.Z.L.R. 689 (H.C.)
205. [1990] 2 All ER 103, 106 (P.C.).
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cases.  Possible arguments along these lines might include cases
brought against the indigent, especially those who can gain wide
publicity by use of the internet at very little cost to themselves.
However, the absence of business for the offense convinced the
Calcutt Committee206 and the Supreme Court Procedure Commit-
tee on Practice and Procedure in Defamation207 that abolition was
the sensible option.  Abolition would not send a signal that attacks
on reputation are condoned by society — the continuance of civil
libel (as well as other related criminal offenses already described)
would indicate otherwise.
Finally, there are adequate, albeit imperfect, alternative legal
actions which provide redress for attacks on personal reputation or
for harassment.  The catalogue of civil, criminal, and quasi-criminal
developments has been described previously.  All can cater for most
circumstances far more proportionately than criminal libel.  The
sensitivities of the contemporary era are better addressed by legisla-
tion dealing with malicious communications, the harassment of in-
dividuals, public disorder, and anti-social behavior rather than the
more authoritarian contrivance of criminal libel.  In this way, there
is now a range of more proportionate offenses or quasi-criminal
forms of intervention that can handle special cases such as defam-
ers who are penniless (for example, scurrilous schoolboys with ac-
cess to the internet) or those for whom civil libel may hold no fears
(such as the opulent or mentally deranged).208  Unfortunately, the
smack of a state crime lurking in the background seems to be too
tempting for many jurisdictions to forego entirely.
206. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, supra note
68.
207. SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN DEFA-
MATION, supra note 69.
208. See Lisby, supra note 159, at 483.
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